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MARC DASSESSE*

Selected Aspects of European Economic
Community Law on Investments and
Acquisitions in Europe**
What is familiarly called the 1992 train is well on its way to reaching its final
destination on time. All the major pieces of European Community (EC) legislation directly affecting the activity of the financial industry in Europe after
January 1, 1993, have by now either been adopted, as in the case of the second
banking directive, I or are close to adoption, as is the case for the draft investment
services directive 2 and the capital adequacy directive.3
It is indeed fair to say, as suggested recently by some European Economic
Community (EEC) officials, that the Commission of the European Communities
(the Commission) is no longer concerned with the preparation of the 1992 legislation, but instead is concerned with the preparation of post-1992 legislation
and, first and foremost, with the review of the treaties at the political and
monetary level. This review has acquired a sense of urgency as a result of the
momentous events that have taken place, especially in Germany, since November
1989. As far as the 1992 legislation is concerned, the Commission views it as
being "behind it" and is now actually engaged in consultation with the various

*Professor at the Faculty of Law and at the Institute of European Studies of the Free University of
Brussels (U.L.B.); Member of the Brussels Bar.
**This article is based on a lecture given by the author at the 1990 Commercial Law Summer
Conference of the Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary & Westfield College, University
of London.
1. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 on the coordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit
institutions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 32 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 386) 1 (1989) [hereinafter Second Banking Directive].
2. Commission Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on investment services in the securities field, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 42) 7 (1990) [hereinafter Draft Investment Services
Directive].
3. Proposal for a Council Directive on capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 152) 6 (1990) [hereinafter Capital Adequacy Directive].
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Member States to ensure that the 1992 legislation already adopted is transposed
by them into their national legislation in good time and to dispel any problem of
interpretation of the 1992 legislation that may arise for the Member States as they
engage in this transposition process.
The objective of this article corresponds to this post-1992 approach: it endeavors to draw attention to a necessarily limited number of developments that
are taking place in various areas of EEC law that appear likely to have a significant effect, either directly or indirectly, on the way investments and acquisitions
will be structured and financed in Europe in years to come and on the financial
institutions that often play a crucial role in putting these transactions together.
I. Effect of the EEC Merger Control Regulation of December 21, 1989,
Which Entered into Force on September 21, 19904
The origins of the EEC Merger Control Regulation (the Regulation) go back
to 1973 when the Commission first put before the Council of the European
Communities (the Council) a proposal for a regulation, specifically aimed at
controlling the concentration of undertakings in the EC. Needless to say, this
original proposal was revised numerous times before the Council finally adopted
it on December 21, 1989.
A.

THE NEED FOR A SPECIFIC REGULATION AIMED
AT CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS

The EC came to consider a specific regulation aimed at control of concentrations necessary for essentially two basic reasons: the ambiguity of EC law in the
area and the overlapping jurisdiction of the various Member States as regards
multinational concentrations.
1. The Initial Ambiguity of EEC Law in the Area of
ConcentrationsThrough Merger
As is well-known, article 85, sections 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Rome 5 (the
Treaty) declares void any agreement among undertakings that appreciably restricts
competition within the EC. Article 86 of the Treaty, on the other hand, prohibits
the abuse of a dominant position within the EC. A significant difference between
these two Treaty provisions is that article 85, section 3, grants the Commission
exclusive power to approve an agreement otherwise prohibited by article 85,
section 1, if it feels that the anticompetitive effects of the agreement are outweighed by other benefits (for example, advantages for the consumer, or ratio-

4. Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings, 33 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 257) 13 (1990) [hereinafter Merger Control Regulation].
5. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), 25 Mar. 1957, (Treaty of
Rome), 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty].
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nalization of production). No similar provision exists with regard to the prohibition
of an abuse of dominant position laid down by article 86 of the Treaty.
The demarcation between articles 85 and 86 and the possibility of using one
or the other, or both, of these Treaty provisions as the basis for a systematic
control of concentrations in the EC by the Commission has never been completely clear. In its memorandum on concentrations, published in 1966,6 the
Commission distinguished between concentrations and cartels. Concentrations
change the structure of the companies involved and of the market in which they
operate. Cartels, on the other hand, only restrict competition between companies
that remain effectively independent. In line with this reasoning, article 85 of the
Treaty was generally recognized as not being susceptible to application as an
instrument of merger control. Article 86 thus became the Commission's primary
instrument in this area.
In the Continental Can case, decided in 1973,7 the European Court of Justice
held that an abuse of dominant position contrary to article 86 may be committed
if an undertaking already in a dominant position strengthens or extends its
position by acquiring control of another undertaking, thus substantially fettering
residual competition in the market concerned. One obvious drawback of this
approach is, of course, that article 86 cannot be used to control concentrations
when there is no preexisting dominant position.
The demarcation between article 86-applicable to certain types of
concentrations -and article 85 -traditionally held not to be applicable to
concentrations -was significantly blurred in 1987 as a result of the Philip Morris
case. 8 This case concerned the acquisition by one tobacco company, Philip
Morris, of half the controlling interest of another tobacco company, then held by
Rothmans. Some authorities have interpreted the judgment of the Court of Justice in the Philip Morris case as meaning that article 85 could possibly apply to
merger agreements, that is, to agreements leading to the "legal or de facto
control" of one company by one of its competitors. 9 However, it is far from
evident that this was indeed the meaning of the judgment.
In any event, even on the basis of this interpretation, the position remains that
whereas article 85 and article 86 can be used to control certain kinds of concentrations, they are limited and technically inadequate to do the job. For example,
article 86 may not apply if there is no preexisting dominant position, and article
85 may not apply if there is no agreement between undertakings to start with.

6. Commission Memorandum on the problem of concentration in the Common Market, Competition series, Study No. 3, Brussels, 1966.
7. Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. Commission [1973] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215.
8. British American Tobacco Company Ltd. and R.J. Reynolds Inc. v. Commission, supported
by Philip Morris Inc. and Rembrandt Group Ltd., [1987] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4487.
9. Bellamy, Mergers Outside the Scope of the New Merger Regulation-Implications of the
Philip Morris Judgment, FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 19 (1988).
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The upshot of the 1987 Philip Morris judgment, together with the general
move towards the 1992 single market, was, however, to give a new lease on life
to the initial Commission proposal for specific merger control, first introduced in
1973, and to give this proposal a sense of urgency in view of the wave of
concentrations that was taking place in the United States at the time and that
looked likely to lap Europe's shores shortly.
2. Need for "One-Stop" Vetting of Large Mergers
The second factor leading to the adoption of the Regulation was the perceived
need to ensure "one-stop" vetting (expert appraisal) of large concentrations in
the EC. Prior to the Regulation's adoption, mergers of transnational companies
were potentially subject to review by a number of EC competition authorities,
both at the Commission and the Member State levels. This, of course, resulted
in significant ambiguity as to jurisdictional authority as well as potentially conflicting results. Article 21 of the Regulation addresses this issue in the following
way:
1. Subject to review by the Court of Justice, the Commission shall have sole jurisdiction to take the decisions provided for in this regulation [for mergers exceeding
the minimum turnover criteria laid down by the Regulation and thus having a
"Community dimension"].
2. No Member State shall apply its national legislation on competition to any consideration [concentration] that has a Community dimension [within the meaning of
the Regulation].'o
A concentration, as defined by the Regulation," exists -and applicability of
article 85 of the Treaty by the Commission is therefore excluded -not only when
an actual merger takes place, but also, inter alia, when there is a creation of a
concentrative joint venture, or as when two or more undertakings agree to
acquire joint control of one or more other undertakings, with the object and
effect of, sharing among themselves such an undertaking or the assets, even if
the undertakings concerned accept restrictions directly related and necessary to
the implementation of the concentration.
As defined by the Regulation, a concentration will have an EC dimension, and
thus in principle fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission where:
(i) the aggregate worldwide turnover of all, the undertakings concerned is more
than 5 billion ECUs and (ii) the aggregate EC-wide turnover of each of at least
two of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate
EC-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. ' 2 There is, however,
a commitment to review, and in principle reduce, these ceilings by a qualified
majority in the Council, within four years (by the end of 1993). ,3
10.
11.
12.
13.

Merger Control Regulation, supra note 4, art. 21, 33 O.J.
Id. art. 3, at 17.
Id.art. I, at 16.
Id.
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About fifty to sixty concentrations with an EC dimension look likely to come
annually within the Regulation on the basis of the present turnover criteria.
Obviously, this number will increase significantly if, as expected, the turnover
criteria laid down by the Regulation are significantly lowered in four years' time.
The principle of one-stop merger vetting intended by the Regulation is, however,
subject to three exceptions provided for by the Regulation itself, as well as to
limits arising from the fact that articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty are superior to
the Regulation.
B.

ExCEPTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
"ONE-STOP

MERGER CONTROL"

1. The "German Clause"
The so-called "German clause" is embodied in article 9 of the Regulation.
Under that article, the Commission may refer a merger that has an EC dimension
to the competent authorities of a Member State if, in substance, the Member
State concerned informs the Commission at the start of the vetting procedure,
that the proposed concentration threatens to create or to strengthen a dominant
position that would significantly impede effective competition in a market within
the Member State if the market presents all the characteristics of a distinct
market, be it a substantial part of the Common Market or not.
If the Commission agrees with the Member State's finding, it may deal with
the case in order to maintain or restore effective competition in the market
concerned, or refer the case to the competent authorities of the Member State
with a view to the application of that State's national competition law. If, on the
other hand, the Commission is of the opinion that no distinct market exists, it
shall rule to that effect, but that decision may be overruled, on appeal from the
Member State, by the Court of Justice. The Regulation does however provide
that the continuation of this very significant exception to one-stop merger vetting
shall be reviewed-and possibly phased out-in four years time (i.e., at the
same time as that provided for a review and possible lowering of the turnover
criteria defining a concentration with an EC dimension).
2. The "Dutch Clause"
Under this clause, embodied in article 22, paragraph 3, of the Regulation, a
concentration that has no EC dimension, as defined by the Regulation, may, at
the request of the competent authorities of the Member State concerned, be
vetted by the Commission. If the Commission finds that the concentrationthough not having an EC dimension-creates or strengthens a dominant position,
with the result that effective competition would be significantly impeded within
that Member State's territory, the Commission may apply to that concentration
the means provided for by the Regulation to safeguard competition if the concentration affects trade between the Member States.
SUMMER 1991
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3. The "National Legitimate Interest" Clause
Under this clause, embodied in article 21 of the Regulation, even if the
Commission approves a concentration having an EC dimension, an individual
Member State "may take appropriate measures . . . compatible with the general
principles ... of Community law" 14 if, notwithstanding the Commission's verdict, the Member State is of the opinion that the concentration threatens its other
legitimate (noncompetition) interests. The Regulation gives a nonexclusive list
of such legitimate noncompetition interests: these are public security, plurality of
the media, and prudential rules.
The Member State must communicate to the Commission any other public
interest invoked before it applies the measures designed to protect such interests.
Within one month of the date of notification, the Commission then must decide
whether it recognizes the public interest invoked as a "legitimate interest" for
the purposes of the Regulation. If the Commission's decision is negative, the
Member State can, of course, challenge the decision before the Court of Justice.
In a speech on February 9, 1990, Sir Leon Brittan, vice-president of the
Commission responsible for competition policy and financial institutions, gave
the following examples of circumstances in which the legitimate interest clause
may apply:
[The legitimate interest clause will apply] if, as a result of a merger above the
regulation's thresholds, a Member State finds itself with an arms manufacturer in the
hands of a group which also supplies to unfriendly foreign governments, or with one
person or company owning too many publications, radio stations or television channels,
or with a person or company who is unfit and improper owning a financial institution. 15
4. Exclusionary Effect of Articles 85 and 86
Finally, besides the three exceptions provided for by the Regulation itself, a
major area of uncertainty with regard to one-stop merger control results from the
fact that articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty have direct effect and cannot be phased
out by the Regulation since they are embodied in the Treaty itself, which is in the
constitution of the EC. This could create a major problem because the threshold
for application of article 85 of the Treaty (if Philip Morris is interpreted as
meaning that it is applicable to certain types of concentrations) and for the
application of article 86 of the Treaty is much lower, in legal terms, than the
turnover criteria laid down by the Regulation.
To resolve this quandary, the Regulation provides that regulation 1716 (the
regulation laying down the powers of the Commission in competition cases) will
not apply to a concentration as defined by the Regulation, regardless of whether
14. Id. art. 21, at 24.
15. Speech by Sir Leon Brittan at Cambridge, England, on the development of merger control
in EEC competition law (Feb. 9, 1990) (Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, Cambridge, transcript at 22) [hereinafter Conference Transcript].
16. Council Regulation No. 17/62, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 87.
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such concentration has an EC dimension (that is, regardless of whether it must
be vetted by the Commission or by the competent national authorities). This
explains why the Regulation and the guidelines for its application presently being
issued by the Commission-DG IV-in effect duplicate a number of provisions
that are found in regulation 17, because this latter regulation is explicitly not
applicable to concentrations.
The provision that regulation 17 is not applicable to concentrations as defined
by the merger control directive, even if they have no EC dimension, means, in
effect, that third parties will probably not be able to challenge a concentration
authorized by the national control authorities on the ground that it is contrary to
article 85 of the Treaty. Indeed, as stated by the Court of Justice in its judgment
of April 30, 1986, in Ministdre Public v. Asjes and Others (Nouvelles Frontidres), 17 national courts have no authority to declare void an agreement or
concerted practice on the ground that it is contrary to article 85, paragraph 1 of
the Treaty, as long as the rules implementing article 85 have not been adopted
pursuant to article 87 (which they had not been at this time for the airline sector,
with which the case was concerned). 18
It is precisely regulation 17 that embodies the implementing rules of article 85
contemplated by article 87. As a result, by providing that regulation 17 will not
be applicable to a concentration-whether or not having an EC dimension-the
Regulation in effect makes it impossible for a competitor or an unsuccessful
suitor in a hostile takeover battle to challenge on the basis of article 85, a
decision taken by the national competition authorities in respect of a concentration as defined by the Regulation.
If the decision has been taken by the Commission (in the case of a concentration
having an EC dimension), the only avenue open to the unsuccessful competitor
or suitor is to challenge the decision of the Commission directly before the Court
of First Instance. 19 Yet, it is only in very exceptional circumstances that the court
might agree to hear such an appeal since the competitor concerned would face the
uphill task of demonstrating that it has a sufficient "title and interest" within the
20
meaning of article 173, paragraph 2 of the Treaty.
The Regulation does, in fact, provide for a general right of audience for any
natural or legal person "showing a sufficient interest'' 21 during the vetting
17. [1986] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1425.
18. See also Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH [1989] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 803.
19. See art. 3.1.c. of the Council Decision 88/591/EEC/ECSC/Euratom of 24 October 1988
establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
215) 1 (1989).
20. Treaty, supra note 5, art. 173 para. 2 states: "Any natural or legal person may, under the
same conditions, appeal against a decision addressed to him or against a decision which, although in
the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and specific concern
to him."
21. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 4, art. 18, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 257) at 23.
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procedure before the Commission. However, the onus will remain with that party,
if it wants to challenge the Commission's decision, to prove that it has sufficient
interest to raise such an action under article 173, paragraph 2 of the Treaty.
The position is very different if the competitor or rejected suitor decides to
invoke article 86 of the Treaty or challenge a concentration before the national
courts. Indeed, as recognized by Sir Leon Brittan himself in his aforementioned
speech in Cambridge, February 1990, the national courts may, at the request of
an aggrieved third party, "apply article 86 to a concentration since that article
does not require any implementing legislation (contrary to article 85) to be
directly effective (and directly applicable by the national courts). ' 22 The Court
of First Instance very recently confirmed this position in the Tetra Pak case,23
stating that an exemption from the prohibition of article 85.1 on the basis of
article 85.3 does not exempt the parties from the prohibition contained in article
86. Thus, in the words of Sir Leon Brittan,
[T]here is no way of completely ruling out litigation probing the Commission's
policy ...[since] articles 85 and 86 apply (or at least may apply) to certain concentrations (covered by the Regulation) and no Regulation can abrogate the Treaty and the
interpretation placed upon it by the European Court of Justice. . . .What I can offer is
the Commission's commitment to implement the Regulation fully and fairly in the light
of its stated policy objectives: competition in the single market; merger analysis based
on examination of markets as they really operate, and clear demarcation
between the
24
competence of the Commission and that of the Member States.
II. Proposed Directive on Obstacles to
Takeover and Other General Bids25
There is, of course, little point in having a new merger control regulation at the
EEC level if a situation continues to exist whereby companies in some Member
States are in effect immune to mergers or takeovers except on the most amiable
of basis. Very significant differences continue to exist in this respect between the
various Member States.
A.

CURRENT OBSTACLES TO TAKEOVERS IN THE EC

The obstacles to takeovers and other general bids that exist in certain Member
States can be divided into two general categories: (1) Structural hindrances to
takeovers; and (2) National Regulations.
22. See Conference Transcript, supra note 15, at 25. See also speech by Sir Leon Brittan before
the EC Chamber of Commerce in New York (26 March 1990) (transcript at 13) [hereinafter Brittan
speech].
23. Case T-SI/89, Tetra Pak Rausing S.A. v. Commission, 10 July 1990 (not yet reported in E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep.).
24. Conference Transcript, supra note 15, at 25-26.
25. Commission amended proposal for a thirteenth Council Directive, COM(90) 416 final of 14
September 1990, on company law, concerning takeover and other general bids, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 240) 7 (1990) [hereinafter Draft Takeover Bids Directive].
VOL. 25, NO. 2
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1. Structural Hindrances to Takeovers
The first category of obstacles concerns the structural hindrances resulting
from the different ways in which capital markets have developed in individual
Member States. Thus, for example, it is well-known that only a very small
number of German companies are incorporated as public companies limited by
shares, and an even smaller number are publicly quoted on the stock markets. It
is also well-known that the allfinanz German banks have traditionally been a
much larger source of finance for German industry than public issues of shares
and bonds. This situation is diametrically opposed to that existing in the United
Kingdom.
Obviously it is very difficult, and undesirable, for Brussels-based bureaucrats
to attempt to harmonize these structural differences, which have grown historically over a number of years, for reasons that are extremely complex. However,
what Brussels may not be able or willing to do by introducing yet another set of
fresh regulations, the market forces may well succeed in doing.
Thus, for example, the second banking directive 26 and its accompanying
directives on own funds 27 and on credit ratios 28 will make it much more
onerous -albeit over a period of years -for the allfinanz German banks to keep,
let alone increase, the significant holdings that they presently have in many
sectors of German industry.
Another possible source of change may lie in the draft investment services
directive, 29 which provides that credit institutions holding customers' shares on
deposit will no longer be allowed to treat these shares as fungible with their own
portfolio. This may put a question mark over the continuation of the present
practice whereby German banks exercise- or at least can exercise- the voting
rights attached to the shares held on deposit for their customers (Depotstimmrecht).
2. National Regulations
The second category of obstacles concerns the national regulations that fail to
prohibit or to limit the extent to which a potential target company can keep its
shares or part thereof in friendly hands or acquire them itself, either directly or
indirectly. The Dutch and the German companies have for many years displayed
great ingenuity in this field.
One of the best known techniques is the Dutch foundation (stichting), by
which a nonprofit foundation is set up for the purpose of maintaining the identity

26. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 1.
27. Council Directive 89/229/EEC of 17 April 1989 on the own funds of credit institutions, 33

O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 124) 16 (1989).
28. Council Directive 89/647/EEC of 18 December 1989 on a solvency ratio for credit institutions, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 386) 14 (1989).
29. See Draft Investment Services Directive, supra note 2.
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of the company. The directors of the foundation are chosen from the company's
close allies. The foundation, which is fiscally transparent, thereafter underwrites
a large issue of preferential shares of the company. Scripts (bewijzen) representing the right to the dividends payable on the shares are thereafter sold to investors, but the voting rights remain attached to the shares and therefore cannot be
exercised by the investors themselves, but only by the foundation that is legally
the owner of the shares.
B.

PROPOSED TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE

Recognizing the undesirable effect of such limitations on legitimate takeover
activity, the Commission has sought to eliminate them through proposed Council
directives on the subject. The Commission has presently made progress on its
thirteenth draft Council directive on company law concerning takeovers and
other general bids, which had its first reading in the European Parliament in
January 1990. Two key features of the draft takeover bids directive are:
* the limitation of the powers of the potential target company to put in place
poison pills (including sale of assets and increase in capital or acquisition of
its own shares either directly or through a subsidiary) once a bid is launched;
* the imposition of an obligation to launch a bid on all outstanding shares
once a maximum holding of 33.3 percent of the voting rights has been
acquired by the offeror, together with its consolidated subsidiaries, as well
as by any persons acting on the offeror's behalf or in concert with him.
Furthermore, the Commission has indicated that it will amend its proposal for a
fifth company law directive 30 to:
* restrict the issue of nonvoting preference shares;
" abolish the possibility in a company's bylaws to restrict the voting rights
that may be exercised by any one shareholder;
* abolish powers in a company's bylaws giving certain shareholders the exclusive rights to propose the appointment of all directors.
Obviously, the final adoption of these draft or proposed directives, and their
actual transposition in national law, is still some way off.
The scope of these draft or proposed directives-at least initially-may well
be more limited than initially expected. Thus, for example, as a result of an
amendment adopted by the European Parliament, the Commission has amended
the initial text of the draft takeover bids directive in order to allow Member States
to restrict its scope of application to shares in publicly quoted companies only
(whereas the Commission's initial proposal envisaged the application of the
directive to all shares in public companies, including shares in companies not

30. Commission amended proposal for a fifth Council Directive on company law, concerning the
structure of socidts anonymes, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (1983).
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quoted on a stock exchange). The Commission has, however, provided for a
five-year
review period in order to assess the effect of such a restricted applica31
tion.
It is therefore all the more interesting to note that independently of the
Commission's initiatives in this field, pressures are being brought to bear, in
particular in the Netherlands and in Germany, to remove some of the existing
restrictions on shareholders' rights. For example, in the Netherlands, as a result
of pressure brought to bear on the Amsterdam stock exchange authorities by
institutional investors and by shareholders associations, in the wake of one of the
few unfriendly takeovers ever seen in the Netherlands, the Amsterdam stock
exchange authorities eventually succeeded in curbing, inter alia, the use that can
be made of foundations as a way of discouraging takeover bids. This success
came after stiff opposition from both large Dutch companies and from Dutch
trade unions.
Such individual challenges will likely become much more frequent as shareholders become increasingly restive to these kinds of restrictions and as more and
more investors, including insurance companies and pension funds, are allowed
or able to acquire shares in companies located in other Member States. This new
acquisition ability is a result both of the 1988 directive on free movement of
capital, effective since July 1, 1990,32 and more importantly, of recent Commission initiatives aimed at removing the restrictions presently imposed on institutional investors, such as insurance companies, usually in the name of
assets
33
matching, regarding the assets in which they can invest their reserves.
III. The Extraterritorial Application of EEC
Competition Law and the Issue of Reciprocity
A.

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF

EEC

COMPETITION LAW

For years, many Member States have repeatedly complained that U.S. courts
applied U.S. competition law to situations that largely lay outside the United
States. It is striking to see, now that the EC is putting muscle in its own
competition policy, how this policy, too, reaches if need be to non-EEC based
companies.
Since the celebrated judgment of the Court of Justice in the Wood Pulp case
handed down on September 27, 1988, 34 it is clear beyond a doubt that agreements or concerted practices entered into anywhere in the world may run afoul
31. Draft Takeover Bids Directive, supra note 25, art. 1.
32. Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the
EEC Treaty, 31 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 178) 5 (1988) [hereinafter Free Movement of Capital
Directive].
33. See infra notes 44 & 45.
34. Ahlstrom v. Commission, [1988] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 5193.
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of EEC rules on competition even if entered into between companies that are all
based outside the EC. It is therefore equally clear that a concentration between,
for example, two large U.S. multinationals can have an EC dimension and hence
become subject to review by the Commission pursuant to the merger control
Regulation, if the turnover criteria laid down by the Regulation are fulfilled.
Thus, a situation could arise in which a concentration authorized in the United
States is nonetheless held up, or at least significantly delayed, by action taken by
the Commission (if the concentration has an EC dimension) or by the competent
authorities of one Member State (if, for example, the German clause is applied).
In a speech held in New York in March 1990 before the EC Chamber of
Commerce, Sir Leon Brittan expressed the Commission's position as follows:
I should stress that the Community's rules on jurisdiction in competition cases apply
to mergers as well. In consequence any concentration, wherever conceived or born,
involving any undertakings, wherever located, must be notified if it meets the threshold
requirements. If the significant amount of business within the Community required by
the thresholds occurs, the merger will engage our jurisdiction. Any remedies ordered by
the Commission as a result of proceedings under the Regulation will take account of the
interests of foreign states, including of course the U.S. Nevertheless, to use the jurisdictional language of our Court of Justice, there can be no doubt that if mergers which
are liable to have a significant impact on the competitive structure of our market are
implemented in our territory, our jurisdiction will be35engaged and we shall exercise it
to safeguard competition in the Community market.
Short of a bilateral agreement between the United States and the EC to avoid
conflicting decisions in the competition field, a development that Sir Leon Brittan has called for, but which is surely unlikely to materialize in the immediate
future, one can foresee some field days in the years to come for competition
lawyers on both sides of the Atlantic. The Minorco/Goldfields and the
BAT/Holyake/Farmers battles of recent years could be in for a reverse performance, with the use of delaying tactics taking place this time on the European
side of the Atlantic.
B.

RECIPROCITY IN EC LEGISLATION

Reciprocity has been a recurring theme in all EEC 1992 financial legislation
since it was first introduced in the original proposal for the second banking
directive. It remains an issue in nearly all the pending or adopted legislation
directly or indirectly affecting mergers within the EC.
1. Position under the Merger Control Regulation
and the Second Banking Directive
The merger control regulation deals with the issue of reciprocity in article 24,
entitled "relations with non-Member countries." It is understood that this article
was introduced in the Regulation at the insistence of France.
35. Brittan speech, supra note 25, at 14-15.
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I would tend to agree with Sir Leon Brittan when he said in his New York
speech that "this is emphatically not a reciprocity clause" 36 though I would add
the words "at least for the time being." Indeed, under the Regulation, to quote
from Sir Leon's New York speech:
[T]he handling of individual cases will not be affected by any consideration of whether
the merger in question would have been permitted in the country of origin of any of the
companies involved. Member States are merely entitled to inform the Commission of
general difficulties encountered by their undertakings in respect of concentrations in a
non-member country. The Commission will report to the Council and make appropriate
recommendations. If it appears that a non-member country does not afford Community
undertakings treatment comparable to that which the Community affords its undertakings, the Commission may ask the Council for a negotiating mandate with a view to
obtaining such a comparable treatment for Community undertakings.
These provisions are certainly far removed from those inserted even in the
final version of the second banking directive. In particular, the provision stating
that "measures taken (by the Commission pursuant to this article) shall comply
with the obligations of the Community or of the Member States 38 . . . under
international agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral" goes much further
than the equivalent article of the second banking directive, namely article 9,
which reads as follows: "Measures taken pursuant to this article shall comply
with the Community's obligations, under any international agreement, bilateral
or multilateral, governing the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit
institutions." The same language has been inserted in the proposed investment
services directive. 39 As one can see, no reference is made there to the Member
States' obligations under any bilateral or multilateral agreement.
2. Points Under the Draft Takeover Bids Directive
The draft takeover bids directive embodies a very different approach to the
reciprocity issue by leaving this question to be addressed by the individual
Member States on a purely bilateral basis. The recitals of the draft takeover bids
directive explain the reason for this approach with a great degree of candor:
* Certain recent events have raised the question whether the directive should
introduce a reciprocity clause towards bidders from third countries.
" The need for such a clause has been emphasized by those who say that in
general it is easier for a company from a third country to take control of an
EC company than the opposite.
* The situation within the Community is not as open as one may think.
Indeed, company law in several Member States also allows companies to
adopt a range of defensive measures to ensure that control of the company

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Merger Control Regulation, supra note 4, art. 24, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 257) at 25.
Draft Investment Services Directive, supra note 2, art. 7.7.
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remains in the hands of friendly shareholders. These defensive measures are
very widely used in some Member States. As a consequence the conditions
in which a takeover bid is carried out vary considerably between Member
States.
0 Against this background, and given the lacunae which exist within the
Community, it would be premature to introduce a reciprocity clause now at
Community level. For the time being and until subsequent harmonization,
into their national law, bearing
Member States may introduce such a clause
40
in mind their international commitments.
This patchwork approach to the reciprocity issue in the various EEC financial
directiyes (merger control regulation; draft takeover bids directive; second banking directive; and draft investment services directive, not to mention the 1988
directive on the free movement of capital will no doubt lead -or at least could
lead -to some surprising results.
True, a takeover of a European company by, for example, a U.S. company
resulting in a concentration with an EC dimension will not be stopped in the
name of reciprocity. But, the Member State in which the European target company is incorporated will be free to allow that company to introduce poison pills
frustrating the bid, since it is not bound to apply the provisions of the draft
takeover bids directive limiting the use of such poison pills by the companies
incorporated in its territory if they are on the receiving end of a bid from a
non-EEC company.
Similarly, the U.S. financial adviser of the prospective offeror (including a
European branch or a European subsidiary of that U.S. financial adviser) could
find itself restricted in its ability to assist its U.S. client to make the bid in the first
place. This restriction can result from a finding by the Commission that says the
United States does not give national treatment to EC financial advisers operating
in the United States in similar circumstances. Yet, the draft takeover bids directive expressly requires the offeror, whether or not it is incorporated in the EC, to
"be represented either by a qualified person authorized to deal on the Community financial markets or by a credit institution authorized within the Commu4
nity.''
3. Points Under the Free Movement of Capital Directive
The same, incoherent situation can arise in respect of the freedom to transfer
the funds necessary to finance the acquisition or the freedom to repatriate the
proceeds of assets sales. Indeed, "[i]n their treatment of transfers in respect of
movements of capital to and from third countries, the Member States [must only]
endeavor to attain the same degree of liberalization as that which applies to

40. Draft Takeover Bids Directive, supra note 25, recital no. 21.
41. Id. art. 9.
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obligation of best effort "shall not prejudice the application to third countries of
domestic rules or Community law, particularly any reciprocal conditions, concerning operations involving establishment, the provisions
of financial services
43
and the admission of securities to capital markets.'
Viewed against this background, there would appear to be little doubt that the
issue of reciprocity could flare up again in the future across the whole range of
financial transactions involving U.S. or Japanese firms on the one side and
European firms on the other side, and this even if the Uruguay Round is successfully completed in the coming months (following the impasse reached in
Brussels in December 1990) and if it covers financial services.
IV. The Move Towards a Single European Currency
European companies and pension funds have in many countries often been
forced by their local regulators to invest their reserves in designated categories of
assets. Usually, these regulations have imposed a substantial level of investment
in local shares or bonds, especially bonds issued or guaranteed by the national
governments. The standard justification for these requirements is the necessity to
match assets and liabilities in the same currency. Budgetary considerations have,
of course, very often been the real justification for these restrictions.
The second directive on non-life insurance, already adopted and in force for
large risks, 44 the second directive on life assurance, adopted but not to enter into
force until May 20, 1993, 45 and the proposed directives (some far advanced
along the European legislative process), dealing with life insurance companies
and pension funds, 4 6 go a long way towards scrapping these restrictions.
Obviously, the further the progress towards a European single currency, or
more realistically, towards a system of fixed parities, the more difficult it becomes for national regulators to justify these restrictions by the necessity to
match liabilities and assets in the same currency. The move towards a European
currency also implies important limitations on the ability of national regulators
to require banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and the like to insist on
investing a significant proportion of their reserves in government bonds. Indeed,
42. Free Movement of Capital Directive, supra note 32, art. 7.1 para. 1.
43. Id. art. 7.1 para. 2.
44. Second Council Directive 88/357/EEC of 22 June 1988 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and laying
down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending
Directive 73/239/EEC, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 172) 1 (1988).
45. Second Council Directive on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of
freedom to provide services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC, 33 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 330)
50 (1990).
46. A pension fund directive expected to have been proposed by the Commission by the end of
1990, see "Advance 1992" of March 1990, p. 5, is now anticipated in early 1991.
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the move towards a single European currency -or at least towards fixed parities
between the various national currencies-not only implies a prohibition on individual Member States to finance their deficit at will by borrowing from their
national central bank (instead of raising taxes), but also implies the prohibition
of attempts to reach the same result indirectly, by obliging local banks, insurance
companies, and the like, to stuff their portfolio with bonds issued by the national
government or by the local authorities.
These twin developments, coupled with the momentous developments that
have taken place in the EEC tax field in June 1990 due to the adoption of three
very important tax measures 47 after a deadlock of more than twenty years, and
48
the likely adoption of additional EEC-wide tax measures in the near future as
a result of this breakthrough, look set to change fundamentally the ways in which
acquisitions and mergers will be financed and put together in the years to come.

47. See Convention 90/463/EEC on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the
adjustment of profits of associated enterprises, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 225) 10 (1990); Council

Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of
parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 225) 6
(1990); Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable
to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different
Member States, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 225) 1 (1990).
48. See in particular the proposal (as yet unpublished in 0. J. EUR. COMM.) for a directive
suppressing withholding tax on payment of interest and royalties between companies belonging to an
international group.
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